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Is fre insurable?
Insights from bushfres in Australia
and wildfres in the United States
Kenneth S. Klein

Fire and insurance have been conjoined for a very long time. On 2 September
1666, the Great Fire of London began. Estimates are that when the fre was
done four days later, 70,000 of the City’s 80,000 inhabitants were homeless.
And at least myth – perhaps reality – has it that in the immediate next several
years, out of the ashes of that fre the idea of the frst fre insurance company
germinated to fruition in the mind of Nicholas If-Jesus-Christ-had-notdied-for-thee-thou-hadst-been-damned Barbon (James 1954, pp. 44–45). In
the following 450+ years, fre and insurance have taken a journey together
in an inter-relationship that continues to evolve.
Today, most homeowners want full and adequate fre insurance, are
willing to pay for it, think they have it, and yet do not. Whether ‘bushfre’ in Australia or ‘wildfre’ in the United States, the frequency, intensity,
and economic impacts of catastrophic fre events are increasing. The State
of California, for example, now essentially has a year-round fre season
(CalFire 2021). And the consequence is that dwelling insurance is becoming
less afordable, less available, and less adequate. Ubiquitously afordable,
adequate, available dwelling insurance is an aspiration that seems more
remote now than ever, and yet also more necessary than ever.

Homeowners want to and think they have fully
insured their dwellings for fre
Homeowners want to fully insure their homes, and until disaster strikes,
think they have done so. It is postulated that one reason, ‘individuals do
not buy insurance is that they perceive the probability of a loss to be below
their threshold level of concern so that the benefts of insurance exceed the
associated premium and search costs’ (Kunreuther 2018, p. 143). Depending
upon the theorist, this sometimes may be described as an adverse selection
problem, or price elasticity. Taken out of economics jargon, it is theorising
that one reason there may be uninsureds or underinsureds is that individuals do not want to share the cost of someone else’s risk.
The theory is intuitively plausible, but apparently at least for homeowners deciding about insuring their dwellings for fre, the theory is wrong.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003157571-12
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Amongst homeowners who have dwelling insurance for fre, most want adequate (meaning, full) insurance. And most homeowners who have a choice,
choose to insure their dwelling for fre.
Simply put, homeowners typically do not choose to underinsure their
dwelling. Most homeowners want to fully insure or over-insure. This is an
incidental but important fnding of work by economists Benjamin Collier
and Marc Ragin (Collier & Ragin 2019, Table 9.3). They studied the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in the United States. It is a public insurance product, sold by private insurance agents. In other words, all insurers
ofer the same product – the only variable is the agent selling it. Collier and
Ragin were interested in the NFIP for this reason – they were trying to study
the infuence of an insurance agent on the decision of how much insurance
to buy. And the NFIP Program lets them control for all other variables.
The NFIP ofers maximum cover of $250,000, and a minimum cover of 80%
of the estimated rebuild cost or of $250,000, whichever is less. Collier and
Ragin isolated policies with estimated rebuild costs of less than $250,000.
In other words, in these instances, insureds had a choice of 20% underinsuring, insuring to estimated rebuild cost, or over-insuring up to $250,000. 80%
of homeowners either insured to the insurer’s estimated rebuild costs, or
over-insured above that. And in Australia a survey of homeowners afected
by the ACT bushfres found an identical number – 80% said they were adequately insured (Australian Securities & Investment Commission (ASIC)
2005, p. 63).
And most homeowners – either voluntarily or involuntarily – do insure
their homes for fre. ‘Homeowner’ or ‘householders’ insurance, as the product denomination implies, provides cover for the owner of a dwelling in the
instance of damage or destruction of the dwelling (Federal Insurance Ofce
(FIO) 2015, pp. 13, 15–20; Australian Competition & Consumer Commission
(ACCC) 2020, pp. 12–17). Homeowner insurance may insure both the dwelling and/or the contents of the dwelling. For homes with a mortgage, however, insurance of the structure – the collateral for a mortgage loan – is
not a choice; mortgages in both Australia and the United States require the
homeowner have insurance of the mortgaged dwelling for fre (ACCC 2020,
p. 147; FIO 2015, pp. 3, 15).
Because of the architecture of mortgages in the United States, there
almost always is fre insurance of the dwelling in place for homes with a
mortgage. Most mortgages in the United States provide that if the borrower
allows insurance to lapse then the lender will purchase ‘force-placed’ insurance at the borrower’s expense; this insurance protects the lender from a
fre loss of collateral (Cronkite 2016, p. 691). There does not appear to be
an analogue in Australia to force-placed insurance, where it seems at least
theoretically possible for a home under mortgage to have no insurance of
the dwelling for fre (ACCC 2020, p. 462).
Nonetheless, the prevalence of insurance of dwellings for fre is exceptionally high and nearly identical in both the United States and Australia. In the
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United States, over 90% of homes – perhaps as high as 95% – have homeowner insurance (Insurance Information Institute (III) 2016). In Australia,
89%–96% of homeowners have an insured property (Booth & Tranter 2018,
p. 3137; ACCC 2020, p. 269). In other words, the presence or absence of
force-placed insurance mechanisms does not seem to impact the likelihood of whether a mortgaged dwelling is insured. In both Australia and the
United States, all or almost all mortgaged homes are insured for fre if for
no other reason than they have to be.
But also, in both the United States and Australia, the voluntary take-up
rate for insuring dwellings for fre is exceptionally high. In the United
States, from 2011 to 2018, only 59%–66% of homes had a mortgage or line
of credit secured by a home (averaging 63%) (United States Census Bureau
2021). Meaning 73.5%–87.8% of homeowners in the United States who have
a choice, choose to have dwelling insurance coverage for fre. Similarly,
the most recent data from the Australian Government is that 53.7% of
homeowners have a mortgage (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare
(AIHW) 2020). Meaning 76.2%–91.4% of homeowners in Australia who
have a choice choose to have dwelling insurance coverage for fre.
One striking feature of these fgures is that the data highlights that for
homeowners, there is something diferent about fre risk in particular, in
contrast to food risk. In the United States, only 13%–15% of owner-occupied
homes are insured for food and for 40% of these homes, food insurance is
required, meaning in the United States only 8.2%–9.6% who have a choice,
choose to have food insurance (III 2016, p. 5; 2021c; Strochak et al. 2018).
Australia appears to have a somewhat better penetration of food cover
than the United States, but certainly still nothing like the prevalence of fre
cover. In 2008, the Institute of Australian Actuaries reported that insurance
for the ‘overfow of rivers and creeks following long duration rainfall’ was
‘becoming more common, although is still far from the norm’ (Institute of
Actuaries of Australia (IAA) 2008, p. 1). By 2011, the Insurance Council of
Australia (ICA) predicted that by 2013 food cover could rise to as high as
30% (Australia Government, The Treasury 2011, p. 22, n. 10).
Why is take-up of fre cover diferent than food? It seems to be a
combination of two factors. First, in both the United States and Australia
there seems to be persistent confusion about whether standard home insurance covers food (Carter 2012, p. 21; III 2017, p. 2, 6, 9). Second, as the
Australia Government describes, the core problem is, ‘all home insurance
policies include cover for bushfre, earthquake, cyclone and storm, but not
food. … food cover has traditionally been excluded from home insurance
policies, and only over the last decade has food cover been made available
by a limited number of insurers. Where it is available, consumers are often
able to opt-out of food cover and evidence indicates that, when able to optout, many policyholders do so’ (Australia Government, The Treasury 2011,
p. 29). Similarly, in the United States, typically food cover is excluded from
mortgage-required and mortgage-compliant dwelling insurance (FIO 2015,
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p. 3). All of this suggests that amongst natural disaster hazards, fre risk
to owner-occupied dwellings perhaps is unique in that fre ubiquitously is
insured both voluntarily and involuntarily.
This conclusion is bolstered by voluntary take-up rates of fre insurance for renters, which starkly contrasts with take-up rates for fre insurance of the dwelling. A renter, by defnition, has no ownership interest in
the structure, and so only insures their personal property – the contents of
the dwelling – for fre. In Australia, three-quarters of renters do not have
personal property insurance (Quantum Market Research 2014, p. 11). In the
United States, the take-up rates of renters insurance steadily rose from 29%
in 2011 to 57% in 2020 (III 2017, p. 4; 2020, p. 11). For some portion of renters
in both Nations, landlords require renter’s insurance. At this time, there is
no data on what percentage of landlords that is. But whatever the percentage, it means that in both Nations, voluntary take-up of renters insurance
for fre loss still materially lags the voluntary take-up rates of homeowners
for dwelling loss.
All available evidence suggests that homeowners – and uniquely homeowners – want to insure their dwellings for fre, want to fully insure their
dwellings for fre, and think they have fully insured their homes for fre. But
they haven’t.

The high frequency of inadequate insurance of dwellings
for fre in Australia and in the United States
Aspirations aside, while it is hard to know with specifcity, it appears
that most homeowners are underinsured for a total fre loss, probably
profoundly so.
Any discussion of underinsurance begins by discussing how it is even possible. There was a time in the United States when ‘Guaranteed Replacement
Coverage’ (GRC) – what in Australia is called ‘Total Replacement’ – was
ubiquitous. The standard in the United States today is ‘Full Replacement
Coverage’ (FRC) – what in Australia is called ‘Sum Certain.’ Under GRC,
if a covered causal event results in a total loss, then the cost to rebuild is
covered, regardless of the cost. Under FRC, by contrast, there is a stated
coverage limit, which can be increased through the purchase of ‘Extended
Replacement Coverage,’ but either under FRC or under FRC plus an extension, there is a hard cap. If there is a hard cap, then there is the possibility of
underinsurance, meaning the amount of insurance proceeds is inadequate
to rebuild the lost home in the event of a total loss.
Work done in Australia illustrates the challenge in answering the simple question: What percentage of homeowners have inadequate insurance
to rebuild their homes? In 2005, in the wake of the 2003 Canberra fres,
when summarising the Australian research, the Australian Securities &
Investment Commission (ASIC) decided to investigate the causes of underinsurance and reported that the percentage of homeowners underinsured
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by 10% or more had been calculated twice – once as 27.5% and once as 81%
(ASIC 2005, pp. 13, 15). ASIC did not opine which number more approximated the truth. Nor to date has any further work been published doing so.
Work in the United States has fared little better. A variety of post-disaster
surveys of underinsurance have been done. The consumer advocacy group,
United Policyholders, has done a number of post- disaster surveys, fnding
a range of underinsurance frequencies but generally fnding it to be over
50% (United Policyholders survey 2021). One of the early pioneers studying underinsurance, Peter Wells, reported (without transparency as to data
or methodology) on his calculations of underinsurance nationwide in the
United States over several years (Wells 2007, p. 46). And after the 2008
California wildfres the California Department of Insurance (CDI) performed a Market Conduct Study on underinsurance rates, fnding it to be to
approximately 80% (CDI 2010, pp. 1027–1030).
All of the analysis from Australia and the United States shares one
feature – as a stand-alone data point it is subject to critique. Either the analysis is not transparent and replicable, or it is too focused on a specifc region
in a specifc context, or it is contradicted by other contemporaneous work.
Yet thought of collectively, the work tells a story. Figure 9.1 is a chart of every
extant, public-facing assertion of underinsurance either in the United States
or Australia, whether regional or national, whether post-disaster or not:
This chart simultaneously is frustrating and illuminating. The chart
highlights how little currently can confdently be known in any granularity

Figure 9.1 United Policyholders
Source: United Policyholders (2021); Fried (2017); Administrative Rulemaking File (2015,
pp. 1027–1030); Wells (2007, p. 46); ASIC (2005)
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about the pervasiveness of underinsurance. But the chart also makes plain
that whatever is going on, it likely is alarming. The possibility of underinsurance seems to be ubiquitous. In other words, most insureds have a coverage limit, and an inadequate one. Because if most homeowners, or even
many homeowners, had GRC, then one wouldn’t see these high percentages
of underinsurance. It simply would not be possible.
One additional data point that is not in this chart is instructive. It is a
rate fling by a California insurer after the 2017 Santa Rosa fres (CSAA
Insurance Exchange 2018). In the United States, many states require that in
order for an insurer to sell a policy at a particular rate, the insurer must fle
the proposed policy and rate with the State and get state approval (FIO 2015,
p. 15). California is one such state (CDI n.d.). The fling by insurer CSAA
sought to support a rate increase by detailing the prior claims adjustment
experience. And the data provided is consistent with two-thirds of insureds
being underinsured, most of them profoundly (by at least 20% or more).
And when one asks, when a homeowner is underinsured, is it by a lot or a
little, the news does not get better. The data is sparse. But when the studies go
the next step and inquire – when one is underinsured, on average how much
is the protection gap? – the answer again is by a lot, likely conservatively on
average by at least 20%, more likely by quite a lot more (Klein 2019, pp. 46–50).
So, how does this happen? Most homeowners put little thought into coverage limits. In Australia many homeowners do not seek input. Surveys in
Australia suggest 56% of homeowners pick coverage based on their own
estimate or the purchase price (which 85% of the time is more than twoyears stale), while only 22% rely on the insurer’s guidance (Quantum Market
Research 2014, p. 17). In the United States, a homeowner simply contacts an
agent or broker, goes to a website, or calls a national telephone number, and
asks for insurance on their house. The homeowner is asked a few questions,
is quoted a policy cover and cost, and a deal is struck.
For the homeowner who wonders whether the cover is adequate, the
advice they are given is to ask the insurer. For example, in the United States,
the Insurance Information Institute says, ‘… your insurer will provide a
recommended coverage limit for the structure of your home….’ (III 2021a;
2021b). The National Association of Insurance Commissioners says, ‘Your
insurance agent usually will help you decide how much dwelling coverage to
buy when you frst get homeowners insurance. Your coverage should equal
the full replacement cost of your home’ (National Association Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) 2010). The website of the Texas Department
of Insurance says, ‘Your insurance agent can help fnd out your rebuilding cost.’ (Texas Department of Insurance 2021). And the website of the
North Carolina Department of Insurance says, ‘Below are a few important
questions that everyone should ask their agent when purchasing homeowners insurance 1. Do I have enough insurance to rebuild my home if it is
destroyed?’ (North Carolina Department of Insurance 2022). Australia is
no diferent. In Australia, ‘Consumers generally need specialist assistance
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to estimate rebuilding costs, but it is often impractical to refer to builders,
architects or quantity surveyors. Many insurers now provide consumers
with access to web-based calculators.’ (ASIC 2007, p. 10). Or more simply
put, most of the time the estimate of the rebuilding cost of a house, if there
is one, comes from the insurer. If the estimate is wrong then the insurance
is wrong.
But that does not, in and of itself, explain underinsurance. Because there
is no precise, mathematical, objective cost for the rebuilding of a home.
Until a home is actually being built, it always is an estimate that will to one
degree or another, in one direction or another, be wrong.
One would expect, however, that estimates of coverage to break evenly
high and low, meaning the rate of underinsurance should group around the
50% line, and distribute evenly above and below. And it does not. Figure 9.1
illustrates that there are dramatically more instances of underinsurance
than of over-insurance.
One way to understand underinsurance rates disproportionately clustered above the 50% line is to think of them as akin to the idea in mathematics called a mathematical fallacy. In broadest terms, a mathematical
fallacy is when the conclusion of a proof suggests that there is a faw in the
proof, even if the faw cannot be identifed. Think, for example, of a coin
fipped 1000 times. 700 times it comes up heads. 300 times it comes up tails.
The experiment is repeated. Now the results are 650 heads, 350 tails. It is
repeated again. 800 heads. 200 tails. Something is wrong. Maybe the coin is
weighted unevenly. Maybe something else is going on. But it bears investigation. Because something may be amiss.
What may be amiss with dwelling insurance? Why are more homes underinsured than over-insured?
In 2007, ASIC reported, ‘Even if a consumer correctly estimates what it
would cost to rebuild their home in a one-of total loss, it is almost impossible to know what it will cost to rebuild a home that is destroyed in a mass
disaster. The surge in building prices that occurs after a mass disaster can
be very unpredictable.’(ASIC 2007, p. 13). This idea – demand surge – also
is profered in the United States (Klein 2019, pp. 69–71). The premise of the
profered explanation –’the surge in building prices that occurs after a mass
disaster can be very unpredictable’ – bears further study. Catastrophe modelers (creating data streams for vendors who sell costs estimators) contend
they can predict natural disaster with granularity down to a specifc home
address (Raizman & Pratt 2021, 1:12;10–1:31:55).
Whether this granularity of modelling is real or not, however, the data
suggests that demand surge alone is an inadequate explanation. In the wake
of the 2017 Tubbs Fire in California, CoreLogic studied demand surge and
found it averaged 15%–30% (Kopperud 2019). In a Market Conduct Study
in 2010, the CDI found, however, that approximately 57% of homes that had
purchased an extension of their full replacement coverage still were underinsured (CDI 2010, pp. 1027–1030).
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If ubiquitous underinsurance is not primarily driven either by demand
surge or homeowner choice, then that suggests a new hypothesis: the likely,
primary cause of ubiquitous, unintended underinsurance is the estimating
tool. Coverage limits are not plucked out of the sky. Rather, insurers estimate rebuild costs using tools in the United States called ‘component cost
estimators’ and in Australia called ‘elemental estimating calculators.’
These estimating tools essentially are big data analytics at their fnest.
Data sets of millions of construction projects and price lists are broken
down into individual labour and materials line items, sorted by location
and date. These data sets are updated at least quarterly, sometimes more
frequently, to capture localised construction cost trends. An insured house
is identifed as to its elements or components, down to screws and bolts, and
then an estimate is built up for the price of building that precise house in
that precise location. And, as alluded to above, because of the prevalence of
demand surge, other data streams also are involved.
What appears to be happening is that the cost estimating tools informing coverage limits are more often than not simply under-estimating reconstruction costs. Of some frustration is that this is a testable hypothesis, but
it has not been tested. There is a moment in time when one knows with
precision the cost of building (or rebuilding) a home. That is the moment
that construction is actually completed on that home. And at that moment,
the home usually is insured. So, at that moment, the estimating tools are
deployed. The insurer may not know the actual construction costs of every
newly constructed home the insurer insures. But at a minimum, if the home
is one that was rebuilt after a total loss, and the rebuild was adjusted under
the same insurer that now will insure the new home, the insurer has or had
access to the actual cost of building that specifc home, which, in turn,
means the insurer has a data point allowing it to compare at the same point
in time the actual cost of constructing a specifc home and the estimated
cost to build the same home. A large insurer has access to lots of these data
points. Which means an insurer can construct a mature data set from which
an insurer can know for its insureds and its estimating tools the frequency
of inaccuracy, and the average depth of inaccuracy.
All of this raises two questions: (1) Why would an insurer be open to
selling less insurance than a homeowner wishes to buy? (2) Why would an
insurer be incurious about how well its estimating tools are working? Each
answer is intertwined with the other.
The legal landscape of insurance is complicated, in part because there
is not consensus on what precisely insurance is. Is insurance a quasi- public utility to have maximum risk spreading, or is it a variant of a personal
security product or is it an ordinary contract? Is the relationship between
insurer and insured arms-length, adhesive, or fduciary? Should insurance
markets be free market structures, lightly regulated, or highly regulated? Is
insurance a luxury or a necessity? For an insurer, a complex legal and conceptual landscape creates a set of market incentives that may at frst glance
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be counter-intuitive because it creates an incentive for insurers to – in the
context of a single customer – sell less of their product.
Whether they are correct or not, insurers perceive their customer as highly
price elastic. And while coverage limits pale in comparison with deductibles
as a price determinant, coverage limits do change premiums at least on the
margin. In other words, an insurer might conclude that in a highly competitive market with what the insurer perceives as highly price elastic customers, there is market share to be gained by a slight drop in price. And that the
downside risk is minimal. Because claims in excess of coverage limits – even
suppressed coverage limits – are rare. When those claims are adjusted, in
many instances the insured will not challenge the adjustment. When the
insured challenges the adjustment, many of those challenges will be settled
at a discount. And of those that are not settled, the muddled legal landscape
will result in a total or partial victory for the insurer much of the time.
But that muddled legal landscape may not work so well for an insurer if
the insurer knows (or is found to be wilfully ignorant of) the (in)accuracy of
its own rebuild estimating tools. If an insurer knows about the average error
rates of its own estimating tools, then it cannot so easily prevail on a position that the homeowner knowingly contracted for less than full insurance.
Until the data is collected, it is impossible to know what it will show. But it
is reasonable to speculate that if the data was good for the insurer then the
insurer would tout it. And if the insurer thought the data would be good for
the insurer, then the insurer would do the research. The fact that no insurer
is touting its data is suggestive. But it is far from defnitive. Because in both
Australia and the United States, while getting the cover correct requires
time and expertise, the onus of error falls on the homeowner (ASIC 2007,
p. 7; Klein 2019, pp. 82–97).
There may well be solutions to underinsurance. Two possible solutions
are to require insurer transparency about the accuracy of its estimating
tools, and/or to require – with clarity – insurers to bear the responsibility for
understated coverage limits. But solving underinsurance will do nothing to
resolve the increasing unavailability of afordable fre insurance. To the
contrary, resolving underinsurance could cause prices to rise.

The emerging challenges of afordability and availability of fre
insurance of dwellings in Australia and the United States
While presently – in both Australia and the United States – most homeowners either voluntarily or involuntarily do insure their dwellings for fre, that
may not be the state of matters for long. Increasingly, both Nations face
issues of availability and afordability.
There is inadequate academic literature defning the precise parameters
of afordability and availability of fre insurance of dwellings – either in
Australia or in the United States – in the face of the increasing frequency
and economic impacts of fres. That said, in both Nations the issues are
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considered emergent. For example, on 8 February 2021, the ICA announced
that following ‘A range of inquiries and reviews over the past decade focused
on issues of insurance afordability and availability in high risk areas or
sectors and have identifed potential coverage gaps for some groups of consumers and businesses,’ the ICA ‘is undertaking a review of the insurance
sector’s options for reforms to improve its contribution to national economic recovery and growth, amid concern from insurers, stakeholders and
the community’ (ICA 2021). Similarly, on 19 October 2020 the California
Insurance Commissioner convened ‘an investigatory hearing to initiate a
series of regulatory actions that will protect residents from the increasing
risk of wildfres. …to stabilize the insurance market while protecting lives
and homes, reducing catastrophic wildfre losses, and increasing transparency for consumers’ addressing ‘issues including…[i]nsurance availability
and afordability’ (CDI 2020).
The shape of the problem is not hard to understand. Insurers are proftseeking businesses. Insurers will only write on homes and in communities
that are proftably insurable. Insurability requires risks must be random,
well-enough understood to make pricing and underwriting possible, diversifable, and exist in markets with low levels of moral hazard and adverse
selection (Kousky & Light 2019, p. 355). The market behaviour of insurers is
consistent with fre cover of dwellings increasingly not meeting this standard.
Put another way, as the frequency, intensity, and economic impacts of
fre grow, the afordability and availability of fre insurance shrinks. This is
inevitable in a market where insurance is unregulated or lightly regulated.
As described earlier, insurers have access to sophisticated data analytics
tools that allow them to know with increasing confdence both the likelihood of a wildfre or bushfre coming to an individual home address, and
the likely economic impact on that structure if it does so. An insurer will be
uncompetitive if it does not use this data to isolate high-risk addresses and
then either decline to ofer cover to those addresses or separately cover those
addresses priced in high-risk pools. Because a competitor undoubtedly will,
and thereby price cut an insurer that doesn’t.
The consequence of this insurer behaviour is pressure on governments to
step in with public insurance products as insurance of last resort, or publicly
subsidise private insurance products, or step in post-disaster to recompense
the losses of the uninsured. A government that creates public insurance
products faces the challenge that it may be politically unpalatable to price
this insurance as a high-risk pool but may be fscally reckless not to do so.
A government that subsidises private insurance is creating an externality to
market forces that both may drive up price and may be politically exposed
for the implicit social equity choices embedded in any subsidy program. A
government that repetitively steps in post-disaster may create moral hazard
behaviours amongst homeowners that reduce take-up rates of insurance –
homeowners are less likely to insure large but unlikely losses if they expect
that if the loss occurs, then the government will bail them out.
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There may be a fourth option. It may be possible to restructure markets
to address afordability and availability. This approach would be to remove
the vulnerability to price undercutting of an insurer who does not isolate
high-risk addresses to an insurer who does. How does one do this? Perhaps
by regulation that does not allow ratemaking that accounts for the address
of a home. Such a regulation would impose undistorted risk pools, or at
least undistorted by property address.
Insurers still could and would rate risk on other vectors. Such as the materials a home is built with. Or whether the home has defensible space around
the home. Or the wiring in the walls and its profle for fre risk.
One would expect insurers to still write the risk. Because there are a host
of high-value homes in fre-exposed locations, and insurers will not simply walk away from insuring Bondi Beach, NSW, Australia or Malibu, CA,
United States.
One would expect the price to be afordable. While not a perfect analogue, this has been the experience of a similar structure in private healthcare insurance in the United States under the Afordable Care Act. And
while the data is sparse, there is some reason to believe that in the United
States, the total cost of even private All Perils insurance would be less than
2% of an average homeowner’s annual expenses.
But the data and research are sparse. None of this at present can be
known with confdence.

Conclusions
Both the governments of Australia and the United States identify a high prevalence either of uninsureds or underinsureds as concerning (FIO 2015, p. 3;
ACCC 2020, p. vii; ASIC 2007, p. 2). The title of this chapter poses a question:
Is fre insurable? The answer this chapter gives is unsatisfactory: Perhaps.
This chapter tackles only one issue related to insurance responses to wildfre and bushfre – insurance for rebuilding a home. And this chapter does so
largely in cursory fashion. It is important for any researcher to realise that this
chapter is only a tree in a larger forest. There is so much more involved in a mass
fre event: insurance of out buildings and other structures, personal property,
and alternative living expenses; insurance for renters, businesses, farms, and
mobile homes; and insurance to mitigate the impacts of displacement of persons and jobs. The policy ripples of fre beyond insurance are mind-boggling.
Just to mention a few: relief for the uninsured, health risks, disproportionate
impacts on minority communities or across gender lines, mitigation, resiliency,
energy policy, climate change, and environmental degradation. Insurance of
fre is a book. Fire is a multi-volume set. But ideally this chapter is a primer.
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